THE JURY TRIAL AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES: On The Twenty-First
Century Incarnation of an Eighteenth Century Institution
Maxwell O. Chibundu1
In our contemporary culture, jury trial enjoys the kind of rarified reverence that
only a handful of other institutions can lay claim to. Although occasionally subjected to
criticism by contrarian scholars, the institution, whether in its grand or petit
manifestation, its civil or criminal incarnation, is applauded as an exemplar of the virtues
of democratic governance. Disagreement with outcomes in particular cases may be
occasionally voiced, but such disagreements only burnish the legitimating norms of the
institution. Charges of provincialism, lack of technical sophistication, or even
sociological bias that, if leveled at other institutions might doom them, are viewed either
as correctable minor flaws, or indeed as enhancing the popular grounding on which the
legitimacy of the jury system rests. Directly put, the jury process is viewed and lauded as
the application within the otherwise oligarchic judicial branch of those values of
democratic rule that underpin the legitimacy of representative governance.
In the pages that follow, I ruminate on this widely acclaimed justification of the
jury process. I explore whether democratic virtues, if embedded in the jury system,
optimally validate it in a rule-based system of justice. Should the fact that the jury
system may have functioned in earlier nondemocratic times as a means of checking the
abuse of governmental power necessarily continue to lend it legitimacy in an era of
popular democratic governance? What considerations ought to be factored in, both
normatively and empirically, in determining the wholeheartedness with which the jury

1

Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. This “ticket” to the 2007 University of Maryland
Constitutional Law Schmooze is presented with appreciation to the students in my current Civil Procedure
class whose questions and comments initiated the thoughts that are expressed below.

1

should be embraced as an instance of democratic practice? The exploration proceeds
along the following lines. First, I remark briefly on the historical grounding of the jury
process. Next, I differentiate among the forms of the process with a view to elucidating
the normative values that appear inherent in the various incarnations of the process.
Thirdly, I discuss how these values enhance or are enhanced by the norms of democratic
governance. And finally, I inquire into the continuing fit of the jury process and
democratic governance.

I. The Historical Grounding of the Jury Process
It is commonplace to place the origins of the modern jury to Norman practice. To
the extent that one assumes a Montesquieuan stance that privileges the hardened
institutionalization of the formal separation of public powers over their overlapping
functional use, then, this history may well be correct. In an essay about jury values and
democratic rule, however, it would be remiss not to observe that the idea of using a
college of decision-makers to dispose of a legal case has precedents in the Athenian
Democracy and Roman Republic. The integral connection between “judging” and
“ruling” of course dates even further back. It is probably not accidental that the first fully
developed biblical account of the activities of the reputedly wise King Solomon was the
description of his judicial resolution among two women of conflicting claims to the
maternity of a newborn child. It is true that this activity takes place after he returns as an
all-conquering King, and after worshipping and giving praise, but notably these latter
events are cursorily depicted, while his role as a fact-gatherer and judge are presented in
full bloom.
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These historical antecedents of the intertwining of judging and ruling having been
noted, it is nonetheless the case that the jury trial, as practiced and venerated in the
United States today has its direct precursor in English practice. This precedent is vitally
important for at least two reasons. In the first place, the practice is enshrined in the
foundational document of the Republic. Secondly, its scope and character are explicitly
grounded in historical practice. The Seventh amendment of the Constitution thus
confines the availability of the jury trial in civil cases to those situations in which they
would have been available “at common law,” and further restricts the re-examination of
the “facts” found by a jury to common law practice. The Article III and sixth
amendment’s guarantees of jury proceedings in criminal cases are not anchored in textual
historicism, but the nexus of those rights to due process requirements, and the central role
that “tradition” plays in due process analysis effectively have rendered the interpretation
of the right to jury trial even in criminal cases dependent on the exegesis of English
history.
A primary lesson that many proponents of the jury trial draw from that history is
that a group of ordinary Englishmen, relying on commonsense and an inbred aversion to
tyranny, not infrequently employed their service on a jury to negate the best-laid plans of
an overreaching monarch and her cabinet. Folklores of the jury in English Law thus
often invoke instances in which the jury refused to convict in pseudo-criminal
prosecutions (particularly in “sedition” cases), or returned verdicts of non-liability in
politically charged defamation actions. In these cases, the jury, acting as the conscience
of the community, and secure in the protection afforded by numbers and the requirement
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of unanimity, effectively checked governmental power; or at least its manifestations in
particular cases.
Such illustrious English pedigree often is corroborated by pointing to nineteenth
century examples in American history where ordinary citizens acting through the jury
effectively undermined morally odious governmental compromises such as those
embodied in the Fugitive Slave Laws. With such history in the background, the coalition
of populists, liberals and libertarians who employed the Warren Court in support of
progressive causes understandably saw in the jury a shield against governmental abuse of
power. The decisions of the warren Court are thus replete with glowing language with
which the Court expanded the role of both the civil and criminal juries. The expansion
has been justified in terms of the jury as the “bulwark” of our democratic system; and this
stance continues even though in the most recent past, high-profile jury verdicts (which,
more often than not, implicate race) may be just as likely to be indisputably antithetical to
the preferences of the majority of the population as to support it. Moreover, a close
scrutiny of history will yield as many – and more likely, more – high-profile cases in
which the jury decisions appeared to bend to the will of the powers that be as in
opposition to it. And, of course, the vast majority of cases, even in the most liberal of
democratic republics, have little to do with highly charged political issues. The ordinary
trial, whether criminal or civil, involves little more than the state acting as an arbiter
between one who claims wrongful conduct, and another who pleads innocence. To be
sure, if the state’s role is to be accorded respect, the process by which it arbitrates the
competing contentions of the parties (including itself, when it prosecutes), must be seen
to be fair. An impartial jury may contribute to such a perception, but there is no obvious
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connection between impartiality and the democratic ideal. To idolize the jury system on
the ground that it embodies democratic ideals is, therefore, not necessarily tantamount to
a claim about its efficacy as a problem-solving device in a judicial system. That
idolization may be justified, however, on one of two grounds: the historical and the
symbolic. Let us now examine the symbolic.

II. The Jury as a Democratic Institution
Although it is now reflexive to apply the term “democratic” more in approbation
than description, the modern jury system is commonly portrayed as sharing several of the
attributes that the term has come to connote. But at first blush, the proposition is at least
debatable.
The origins of the jury under Norman practice lay in the vouching by kinsfolk of
the character of the defendant. Effectively assembling a jury thus constituted a vote of
confidence in the continued membership of the defendant in the civil community from
which he would otherwise be excommunicated, whether as a convict or a judgment
debtor. The assembling of a jury today of course serves a quite different purpose.
Among other distinctions, the members of the modern jury, although said to be “peers” of
the person over whom they will sit in judgment, are expressly required to be thoroughly
unacquainted with the defendant, and, as much as possible, to be unconnected with the
events over which they would be sitting in judgment. And they are selected through a
process that appears more reflective indifferent impartiality of a lottery draw than of the
informed passion with which one associates political democracy. What then makes the
modern jury a “democratic” institution?
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The justifications of the jury as a democratic institution proceed along two axes:
the participatory and the representative, with both converging at the point of deliberation.
With regard to the former, the jury process affords the citizen, it is said, an unparalleled
opportunity to participate directly in the process of self-governance. In the courtroom
and its precincts, an otherwise indifferent citizen is made to confront the responsibility of
evaluating the conduct of her fellow citizen, familiarizing herself with the legal rules and
norms of her society, gauging governmental conduct, and ultimately calling the parties to
account for their conduct. The individual juror is thus empowered, along with her
colleagues, to sit in judgment both over fellow citizens, and most importantly, over her
government and the institutions that the government uses to assert power and authority.
And the jurors do so through the process of deliberation. Through these processes, law
and society are rendered intelligible and accessible to the citizen juror who is thus
empowered to take her participatory activism into other arenas of political participation.
This is the basic thesis of the several books that have looked at the jury from the vantage
point of a participant in the jury room.
The other justification of the democratic underpinnings of the jury process is
grounded on its purported “representative” character. The view here appears bottomed
on a series of related assumptions. First, because the modern jury seeks to draw its
membership from a cross-section of the political jurisdiction within which it sits, it is
assumed that the members therefore represent the component population of the
jurisdiction. Secondly, it is also assumed that justice in the particular case is to be
favored when it is the product of the participation of a cross-section of the political
community. Thirdly, given the diversity of views inherent in a cross-sectional pool of
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persons, the demand of unanimity in a jury verdict (or, at least qualified super-majority
voting), and the equal weighting of votes, jury members necessarily engage in extended
deliberation in order to arrive at a verdict. The jury here is said to be democratic, not
because of the values absorbed or made use of by individual jurors, but because the will
of the jury is equated to that of the community.
The composition of the jury and its verdict thus are taken as microcosms of the
larger society. A representative jury thus empanelled may validly override a general rule
by refusing to apply it in the particular case, if, in its view, justice is better served
thereby. This is of course the process of “jury nullification.) Similarly, in deference to
the representative character of a trial jury, an unelected judge ought not to disregard a
jury verdict; at least, not unless there are exceptional circumstances for doing so. A
similar deference is owed the decision of a grand jury regarding its decision to indict.
And finally, the same concerns that motivate the insistence on the secret ballot as a
safeguard of popular democratic political practice are advanced to support the secrecy in
which jury room deliberations and the votes of jury members are often clothe and
justified.
The significance of the participatory justification for linking jury practice with
democratic values can be dispensed with quite easily. Even if one completely credits the
civic virtues that supposedly are embedded in the participation of the individual in the
jury process, it does not follow that the maintenance of a democratic political order is
inexorably linked to the jury process, nor that the validity and efficacy of the jury system
depends on the maintenance of a democratic order. Participation in the jury system may
well foster a democratically-inclined citizenry, but so also, one assumes, can other
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institutions; and these latter may well be both more effective and more efficient in
delivering the good. The educational system, for example, can be targeted with greater
precision than the jury to obtain some of the claimed-for results. More specifically to the
point, it seems correct to say that as long as the focus of the participatory system is on the
benefit conferred on the individual juror (even if society benefits derivatively thereby),
there remains an unbridgeable gap between the acknowledged function of the jury as an
arbiter of adjudicatory interests, whether between private parties, or between a private
person and the state. The function of the jury is not to create a model democratic citizen,
but to adjudicate conflicting claims to socio-economic goods; at least as long as those
claims are presented in adjudicable terms.
The relevance a democratic order of the representative character of a jury, and its
implication as a source of the legitimation of jury decisions deserves more serious
attention. Appropriate scrutiny demands confronting at least two sets of issues. First, is
there empirical support for the claim; and secondly, what are its normative implications?
I address these issues in the next section.

III. The Representative Jury and Democratic Values
Since at least 1975, the United States Supreme court has insisted that a properly
constituted jury must be fairly representative of the cross-section of the political
jurisdiction from which its members are drawn. Relatedly, it has struck down on
constitutional grounds the naked use of the peremptory challenge to remove on race or
sex-based grounds otherwise qualified jurors. Members of the jury pool are thus drawn
essentially from the same basic demographic and political constituency as the voters.
Indeed, it is standard fare to identify as the irreducibly exclusive identifier of citizenship
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the right or privilege to vote and to be a juror. This of course does not mean that all
potential jurors have equal chance to sit in the jury box any more than equal citizenship
implies an equally realistic chance for every citizen’s vote to have the same weight in
deciding the presidency of the United States. Membership within a subgroup of the
community – as a lawyer, school teacher, stay-at-home mother, Lesbian, Lutheran,
Smoker, professed opponent of the death penalty, or wearer of eyeglasses -- to list a few
examples – continue to weigh in the balance on whether an individual is admitted to
membership on a particular jury. But these highly particularistic deviations do not
undermine the representative credentials of the modern jury. The reality is that political
democracy has never fully embodied – at least, to the extent that representation by
individuals can – all possible communal interests. But there is no doubt that
representation on the modern jury has grown along with expansion of the electoral
franchise, and that today’s jury represents a much broader span of views and interests
than did its eighteenth century counterpart that, after all, was based on property
ownership and gender.
But granting the demographic representativeness of the modern jury is not
tantamount to affirming the democratization of the ideologies that underpin it. Indeed,
given the vast sums of money spent on the jury selection process, there is reason to ask
whether a seated jury pool is in fact a democratic representation of the community from
which it is drawn. Anecdotal evidence in high-profile cases similarly support skepticism
of the extent to which the views and considerations that shape jury verdicts are in fact
coextensive with those of the wider population. But an effective answer to the question
would require delving into statistical evidence which is beyond the capacity of this paper
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to furnish. Let us therefore concede the point, and assume that demographic and
ideological representativeness go hand-in-hand; and the views of the jury in fact mirror
those of the political community. But this concession raises a further question: is the
disposition of a judicial case by a representative jury that fairly mirrors the democratic
composition of a society a normative good? The answer to the question, I think, requires
comparing the social values at stake in the adjudication of cases and the democratic
structures of a society. Here, I focus on the basics of both.
At core, democracy is about effectuating the self-governance of a society. Much
as we prize the autonomous capacity of the individual to decide between good and bad, a
proponent of democracy believes that the best choice for a society comes from the
aggregation of autonomous preferences, not necessarily their fusion. Direct consensual
participation by every member of the society would be optimal, but in its absence
representation and majority rule are second order preferences. Contemporary democratic
institutions and structures have, as their primary function, bridging the gap between the
ideal of direct consensual participation and the reality of its impossibility. The demand
for accountability that is often posited as the essence of democratic governance would not
be necessary but for this disjuncture between the ideal and the real. Does and should the
jury system qualify as one such institution?
All cases, at core, are about preserving social peace. Nonetheless, it may be
helpful here to distinguish between those cases that arise because of conduct that directly
threatened the security of the society as a whole (imprecisely, we may think of these as
“criminal” cases), and cases in which one member of society asserts a claim against
another. Here, the effect of adjudication on the maintenance of social peace is indirect.
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Because the former case ostensibly represents a threat to self-governance, a
representative jury may well stand in for what would otherwise be the right of each and
every member to sit in judgment over the threat. This argument would be especially
strong if we view punishment as a decision of whether or not to excommunicate the
miscreant from membership within the political community. On the other hand, might it
not be precisely in his situation that a representative jury is most dangerous? If the
representative jury is no more than the aggregation of the self-interests of those whom
they represent, this would indeed be a major concern. The proponents of juries as
democratic representatives claim, however, that the process of deliberation permits jurors
to take account of not only the immediate self-interests of their constituencies, but the
longer run interests of the community as a collective institution.
The arguments for a representative jury when confronted with a criminal case
would seem to be inapposite in a non-criminal case. Here, it is difficult to see what is
self-expressive or self-determining when one sits in judgment over conflicting claims by
two other individuals. The detachment exists even where the claims arguably are
sociologically representative; for, it is in the nature of litigation that individuals rarely
project themselves into the position of one who suffers the misfortune of being a
participant. And, to the extent that there are representative societal interests to be
vindicated in a non-criminal lawsuit, the legislative enactment of the substantive and
procedural rules that frame the lawsuit are probably sufficient to satisfy them. It is in
such a lawsuit that the need for a genuinely dispassionate decision-maker would seem
most apt.
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IV. A Last Discordant Note
Thus far, I have operated on the assumption that democracy and democratic
values are unalloyed goods. There is at least one sense in which this assumption is
wrong. Even in their most idealized conceptions, democratic institutions are indifferent
to the welfare of persons who do not belong to the political community. Since
democratic theory posits the operation of democratic institutions within limited territorial
boundaries that constitute the political community – village, town, county, state, country
– the practice of democracy ineluctably suffers from a human rights deficit. What
consideration does a democratic polity owe outsiders who are temporarily in its midst? A
representative jury, if it is genuinely a democratic institution cannot avoid the dilemma
that while its democratic credentials require it to be indifferent, the administration of
justice, if viewed as a human right, requires it to step outside the democracy cocoon.
That, of course, is an issue squarely presented by recent controversies over such
legislation as the Detainees’ Treatment act and the Military commissions Act.
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